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Abstract. In this paper, we introduce the TrojAI software
framework † ‡, an open source set of Python tools capable of
generating triggered (poisoned) datasets and associated deep
learning (DL) models with trojans at scale. We utilize the de-
veloped framework to generate a large set of trojaned MNIST
classifiers, as well as demonstrate the capability to produce a
trojaned reinforcement-learning model using vector observa-
tions. Results on MNIST show that the nature of the trigger,
training batch size, and dataset poisoning percentage all af-
fect successful embedding of trojans. We test Neural Cleanse
against the trojaned MNIST models and successfully detect
anomalies in the trained models approximately 18% of the
time. Our experiments and workflow indicate that the Tro-
jAI software framework will enable researchers to easily un-
derstand the effects of various configurations of the dataset
and training hyperparameters on the generated trojaned deep
learning model, and can be used to rapidly and comprehen-
sively test new trojan detection methods.
1 Introduction
As deep learning systems continue to achieve and exceed hu-
man level performance on a variety of tasks, attention has
turned to the robustness, trustworthiness, and reliability of
these models. These topics are typically studied under the
umbrella of adversarial machine learning (AML). As outlined
by NIST [14], the field of AML concerns itself with attacks
against machine learning systems, and their associated con-
sequences and defenses. The taxonomy of AML is large and
covers many types of attacks against machine learning sys-
tems. In this paper, we are concerned with trojan attacks on
deep learning models.
Trojan attacks, also called backdoor or trapdoor attacks,
involve modifying a machine learning model to respond to a
specific trigger in its inputs, which, if present, will cause the
model to infer an incorrect response. They can be carried out
by manipulating both the training data and its associated la-
bels [4] (triggering or poisoning the dataset), directly altering
a models structure (e.g., manipulating a deep neural networks
weights) [21], or adding to the training data that have correct
labels, but are specially-crafted to still produce the trojan be-
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havior [16]. Here, we define a trigger as a model-recognizable
characteristic of the input data that is used by an attacker
to insert a trojan, and a trojan to be the alternate behavior
of the model when exposed to the trigger, as desired by the
attacker.
Trojan attacks are effective if the triggers are rare in the
normal operating environment, so that they are not activated
in normal operations and do not reduce the model’s perfor-
mance on expected or “normal” inputs. Additionally, the trig-
ger is most useful if can be deliberately activated at will by
the adversary in the model’s operating environment, either
naturally or synthetically. Trojan attacks specificity differen-
tiates them from the more general category of data poisoning
attacks, whereby an adversary manipulates a models training
data to make it ineffective.
Defenses against trojan attacks include securing the train-
ing data (to ensure data integrity), cleaning the training data
(to ensure training data accuracy), and protecting the in-
tegrity of a trained model (prevent further malicious manip-
ulation of a trained clean model). Unfortunately, modern AI
advances in deep learning are characterized by vast, crowd-
sourced data sets (e.g., 109 data points) that are impractical
to clean or monitor. Additionally, many deep learning models
are created via transfer learning, such as by taking an exist-
ing, online-published model and only slightly modifying it for
the new use case. Trojan behaviors can persist in these models
after modification. The security of the model is thus depen-
dent on the security of the data and entire training pipeline,
which may be weak or nonexistent. Acquiring a model from
unverified sources brings all of the data and pipeline secu-
rity problems, as well as the possibility of the model being
modified directly while stored at a vendor or in transit to the
user.
Many demonstrations of trojan attacks exist in the litera-
ture [8,16,20,21]. However, it is unclear how well these results
generalize to other triggers, methods of embedding the trig-
gers, data and model modalities, and whether detecting tro-
janed models with one configuration of trigger and embedding
methodology transfers to another configuration of trigger and
embedding methodology. A second problem is that results are
difficult to replicate due to the lack of standardization in the
model training procedures and data poisoning methodologies.
One reason for this may be that the “science” of embedding
trojans into DL models is not yet well characterized. Exam-
ples include the lower bounds of the required data poisoning
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required to produce a desired classification effect, the quick-
est way to embed trojan behavior into the DL model, and
the spatial location of the trigger. We introduce the TrojAI
software framework as a tool to enable researchers to advance
the study of trojan attacks on DL models. The framework
enables the research community to easily reproduce reported
results and standardize metrics for measuring the efficacy of
a trojan attack. Furthermore, it enables research into trojan
detection and mitigation strategies across the space of all pos-
sible triggers, embedding methodologies, and data and model
modalities.
2 TrojAI Framework Overview
The TrojAI software framework is a set of Python modules
that enable researchers to quickly and reproducibly generate
trojaned deep learning classification and reinforcement learn-
ing models. It is configurable and extensible to enable genera-
tion of datasets and models with a wide variety of triggers into
datasets and deep learning network architectures of varying
modalities.
For both classification and reinforcement learning models,
the software package is divided into two Python submodules:
datagen and modelgen. For classification, the user config-
ures the type of data poisoning to apply to the dataset of
interest, the network architecture of the model to be trained,
the training parameters of the model, and the number of mod-
els to train. This configuration is then ingested by the main
program, which generates the desired models. Fig. 1 depicts
this process. A similar sort of process occurs for reinforcement
learning, where instead of a dataset, the user configures a poi-
sonable environment on which the model will be trained. This
is diagrammed in Fig. 2.
Figure 1: TrojAI Classification Framework Overview
Figure 2: TrojAI Reinforcement Learning Framework
Overview
3 trojai Software Package
trojai is a Python package that enables generation of tro-
janed deep learning models for both supervised classifica-
tion and reinforcement learning tasks, using the PyTorch
deep learning framework [11]. The framework was designed
to enable researchers to easily generate large sets of models
with different combinations of data configurations and model
training hyperparameters, in order to better understand the
science of trojaned networks, develop appropriate counter-
measures, and enable experimental reproducibility across the
AML community.
3.1 Supervised Classification Datasets and
Models
For the supervised classification task, datasets and corre-
sponding models are generated using two submodules within
the trojai package:
1. datagen - Synthetic Supervised Classification Data Gen-
eration and Manipulation
2. modelgen - Deep Learning Classification Model Genera-
tion
The submodules produce the tuple: (D, E , M), which pre-
cisely defines how a set of models was generated. Here, D
represents the dataset, E represents the experiment definition,
and M represents the set of generated models.
The data generation submodule, datagen, creates a syn-
thetic dataset, D, and contains the functionality to program
triggers and transformations into the data to be poisoned.
This is specified via various configurations that are detailed
later in this work. Next, experiment definitions, E , are gener-
ated. An experiment defines the subset of triggered data to
be used in training the model and the desired model behavior
on triggered data points.
The model generation submodule,modelgen, usesD and E
to train a set of DL models that contain a trojan, as defined by
the experiment configuration. Although datagen and mod-
elgen work together in the canonical trojai usage pattern, it
is possible to use them independently in order to provide ad-
ditional control into how the data and models are generated.
This may be useful if a corpus of data already exists, and the
user desires to only train models using the existing corpus.
3.1.1 Datagen
The datagen submodule is responsible for generating the
classification datasets that the DL models will be trained
upon. The submodule is data type agnostic, and the current
implementation supports image and text datatypes. There are
four primary class definitions of interest within the datagen
submodule:
1. Entity
2. Transform
3. Merge
4. Pipeline
An Entity is an object that is either a portion of, or the
entire sample to be generated. An example of an Entity in
the image domain could be a shape outline of a traffic sign,
such as a hexagon, or a post-it note for a trigger. In the text
domain, an example Entity may be a sentence or paragraph.
Multiple Entity objects can be composed together into an-
other Entity.
Entities can be transformed in various ways; examples in
the image domain include changing the color mapping, ap-
plying an Instagram filter, or blurring. These transforms are
defined by the Transform class. More precisely, a Transform
operation takes an Entity as input, and outputs an Entity.
Furthermore, multiple Entity objects can be merged to-
gether using Merge objects. Finally, a sequence of Merge
and Transform operations can be defined and orchestrated
through a Pipeline. Raw datasets are generated when a spec-
ified Pipeline is executed.
Implementations of the primary objects that make up the
datagen submodule that are included with the TrojAI open
source package are:
1. Entity
(a) ImageEntity - An entity representing an image.
(b) ReverseLambdaPattern - An ImageEntity which ap-
pears as a flipped lambda symbol. An example is shown
in Fig. 3a.
(c) RectangularPattern - An ImageEntity which has a
bounding box of a rectangle where all pixels inside the
bounding box are “on”. An example is shown in Fig. 3b.
(d) RandomRectangularPattern - An ImageEntity which
has a bounding box of a rectangle where pixels in the
pattern are either “on” or “off”. This pattern appears as
a QR code. An example is shown in Fig. 3c.
(e) TextEntity - An entity representing text data.
2. Transform
(a) Affine
i. RotateXForm - Implements the rotation of an
ImageEntity by a specified angle amount.
ii. RandomRotateXForm - Implements the rotation of an
ImageEntity by a random angle amount.
(b) Size
i. Resize - Implements the resizing of an image.
(c) DataType
i. ToTensorXForm - Transforms an input NumPy array to
a PyTorch Tensor [11] of specified dimensions.
(d) Color
i. GrayscaleToRGBXForm - Converts a 3-channel grayscale
ImageEntity to RGB.
ii. RGBAtoRGB - Converts an RGBA ImageEntity to an
RGB ImageEntity.
iii. RGBtoRGBA - Converts an RGB ImageEntity to an
RGBA ImageEntity.
iv. InstagramXForm - Applies one of the four available In-
stagram filters (Gotham, Nashville, Kelvin, and Lomo)
to the image.
3. Merge
(a) InsertAtLocation - Given two Entity objects, in-
sert one into the other at a specified location. For
ImageEntity objects, the location is specified via a coor-
dinate, whereas for a TextEntity object, this is specified
by an offset from a delimiter.
(b) InsertAtRandomLocation - Given two Entity objects,
insert one into the other at a random valid location.
For ImageEntity objects, “valid” is defined according
to a provided configuration that defines bounds and re-
strictions where the entity is to be placed, whereas for
TextEntity objects, “valid” is defined as any possible
location within the text blurb.
4. Pipeline
(a) XFormMerge - A pipeline that takes input entities, per-
forms defined transformations on these entities, merges
them together, and produces an output entity. A detailed
view of the XFormMerge pipeline is shown in Fig. 4.
The components described above can be used to create im-
ages with predefined patterns that can be triggers or be de-
coys, depending on the research objective. For example, sup-
pose that it is desired to create an MNIST dataset with a
lambda pattern acting as the trigger for a poisoned dataset [4].
This could be accomplished within the TrojAI framework us-
ing a semantic pipeline definition shown in Fig. 5. A simple
extension of this type of trigger is to have a colorized MNIST
digit, with a random rectangular pattern trigger inserted at
a random location. The semantic pipeline definition shown
in Fig. 6 creates such a dataset. While these examples rep-
resent a subspace of the possible point triggers that could
exist in poisoned image datasets, Liu et al. were the first to
demonstrate that “global” transformations such as Instagram
filters could also be used as triggers [10]. An example pipeline
which uses Instagram filters as triggered examples is shown
in Fig. 7. Finally, while most of the research and focus of the
AML community has been in the vision domain, Dai et al.
showed that text processing pipelines are also susceptible to
poisoning attacks [3]. The TrojAI framework allows for poi-
soning text datasets with sentences inserted as triggers. A
sample pipeline which generates text attacks similar to those
outlined in Dai’s original work is shown in Fig. 8 [3].
Figure 5: Badnets Data Generation Pipeline
Figure 6: Badnets-v2 Data Generation Pipeline
Figure 7: Instagram Trigger Pipeline
(a) Reverse Lambda Trigger (b) Rectangular Trigger (c) Random Rectangular Trigger
Figure 4: XFormMerge Pipeline Architecture
Figure 8: Text Pipeline
The following top-level example scripts showcase how to
integrate various components of the trojai module function-
ality:
1. scripts/modelgen/gen and train mnist.py - This script
generates an MNIST dataset with reverse lambda triggers
inserted into images with the label 4 at a static location,
and trains a convolutional neural network with it.
2. scripts/modelgen/gen and train cifar10.py - This
script generates a CIFAR10 dataset with Gotham Insta-
gram triggers inserted into images with the label 4, and
then trains a Densenet [6] model with it.
3. scripts/modelgen/gen and train imdb.py - This script
generates the IMDB sentiment classification dataset with
trigger sentences inserted into positive reviews that flip the
review rating, and then trains a bidirectional LSTM clas-
sifier [5] with a GloVE embedding [12] using the triggered
dataset.
However, the framework allows for new pipelines with dif-
ferent data processing flows to be defined in order to extend
the capability of the framework.
3.1.2 Experiments
Once a dataset has been generated, an Experiment configu-
ration must be created in order for modelgen to be able to
utilize it. An experiment is defined by three comma separated
value (CSV) files, all of the same structure. Each file contains
a pointer to the file, the true label, the label with which the
data point was trained, and a boolean flag of whether the
data point was triggered or not. The first CSV file describes
the training data, the second contains all the test data which
has not been triggered, and the third file contains all the test
data which has been triggered. A tabular representation of
the structure of experiment definitions is shown in Table 1.
file true label train label triggered
f1 1 1 False
f2 1 2 True
... ... ... ...
Table 1: Experiment training and test definition file structure.
3.1.3 Modelgen
The modelgen submodule is responsible for generating mod-
els from the experiment definitions. The architecture is de-
signed to support any data type, but the current implemen-
tation provides support only for image and text datatypes.
The five objects of primary interest in modelgen are:
1. DataManager - An object which facilitates data definition
by the user, and feeding the model with this data during
training and test.
2. ArchitectureFactory - An object factory responsible for
creating new instances of trainable models.
3. OptimizerInterface - An interface which contains train
and test methods defining how to train and test a model.
4. Runner - An object which generates a model, given a con-
figuration.
5. ModelGenerator - An interface for executing a set of
Runner objects, potentially parallelizing or executing in a
cloud or cluster interface.
The interplay of these five primary components can
be described as follows: The Runner is created by
configuring a DataManager, ArchitectureFactory, and
OptimizerInterface. These define which datasets are being
used to train and test the model, the model architecture to
be trained, and the optimizer (Adam [7], Stochastic Gradi-
ent Descent (SGD), etc..) used to perform the weight updates
on the defined network architecture, respectively. Once cre-
ated, the runner is capable of generating n models from the
input configuration. The ModelGenerator object determines
how the Runner is executed, for example, on a single machine,
cloud, or High Performance Computing (HPC) cluster. Fig. 9
depicts how these components work together to produce mod-
els.
Figure 9: Modelgen architecture
modelgen currently supports the following implementa-
tions of the five primary objects described above:
1. DataManager
(a) CSVDataset - Supports loading CSV datasets for train-
ing.
(b) CSVTextDataset - Supports loading text datasets in CSV
format for training, using the torchtext convention.
2. OptimizerInterface
(a) DefaultOptimizer - Supports various optimization algo-
rithms (SGD, Adam [7], . . . ) for training image datasets.
(b) TorchTextOptimizer - Supports various optimization al-
gorithms (SGD, Adam [7], . . . ) for training text datasets.
3. ModelGenerator
(a) ModelGenerator - Trains models on a single hardware
platform, given a runner configuration.
(b) UGEModelGenerator - Trains models on a Univa Grid
Engine (UGE) cluster, given a runner configuration.
The modelgen submodule is configurable and allows for
users to develop their own optimizers, insert custom network
architectures, and data loaders in order to suit their specific
requirements.
3.2 Reinforcement Learning Models
TrojAI also contains structure for the generation of triggered
deep reinforcement learning (DRL) models. The code struc-
ture for DRL is similar to supervised learning in that it
also has a datagen and a modelgen module, but each use
fewer parts to produce a full model. At a high level, TrojAI
generates a triggered DRL model using four components: 1.
an RLOptimizerInterface object, 2. an EnvironmentFactory
object, 3. an ArchitectureFactory, and 4. a Runner object.
These objects are described below, and interact as shown in
Fig. 10.
1. RLOptimizerInterface - Interface containing the train and
test procedures for training the given model architecture on
environments generated by an EnvironmentFactory.
2. EnvironmentFactory - A factory object responsible for cre-
ating new instances of RL environments. RL environments
are expected to follow the OpenAI Gym interface [2].
3. ArchitectureFactory - An object factory producing pro-
ducing model architectures to bve trained.
4. Runner - Combines an EnvironmentFactory, a model, and
an implemented instance of the RLOptimizerInterface to
produce a trained model. Also produces train and test
statistics and saves them as designated.
Figure 10: trjoai RL Framework
Most of the work to produce RL models is performed within
the train and test method of an implementation of the
RLOptimizerInterface. The train method accepts an en-
vironment instance from the EnvironmentFactory and an ar-
chitecture instance from the ArchitectureFactory, and pro-
duces the trained model and a TrainingStatistics objects,
which is included in the modelgen.statistics submodule.
Since TrojAI is meant to be customizable, how the training
occurs is specified completely by the implementer of the op-
timizer. The given EnvironmentFactory should produce en-
vironments as needed for parallelization, if desired, or for
differently configured environments to train on simultane-
ously. The training algorithm then may be as simple or com-
plex as desired. The same applies to the test method, ex-
cept it should produce TestStatistics objects instead of
TrainingStatistics. Optimizers can be designed to run a
single algorithm with very specific hyperparameters, perhaps
encouraging the design of a library of simple optimizers, or
may be designed to be configured on initialization. Since the
Runner will be responsible for calling train and test, any
configuration should be set when the optimizer is initialized.
We include a prototype optimizer called TorchACOptimizer
that trains models using an implementation of Proximal Pol-
icy Optimization (PPO) [13] from the torch ac package [18],
and is highly configurable.
3.3 Metrics
The trojai package collects several metrics of relevance when
training the models on the trojaned datasets and/or environ-
ments.
For the classification task, a successfully trojaned model
is one which meets the following criteria: 1. the model per-
forms as expected by the user on normal inputs, and 2. the
model successfully selects poisoned labels when the trigger is
present at a success rate defined by the attacker. The trojai
module automatically computes classification performance on
the following three subsets of the test data:
1. Clean Test Data - Captures the performance of the trained
model on data for all examples in the test dataset that do
not have the trigger.
2. Triggered Test data - Captures the performance of the
trained model on data for all examples in the test dataset
that have the embedded trigger.
3. Clean Test Data of Triggered Labels - Captures the perfor-
mance of the trained model on clean examples of the classes
that were triggered during training.
A high performance on the three metrics outlined above pro-
vides confidence that the model has been successfully tro-
janed, while also maintaining high performance on the origi-
nal dataset for which the model was designed.
The criteria for a successfully trojaned RL model is simi-
lar to classification in that we desire high task performance
for both clean and triggered environments, but since mea-
sures of performance differ between RL environments, trjoai
cannot automatically compute metrics for each. Rather, the
implementer of the RLOptimizerInterface defines what con-
stitutes high performance, and designates how that is to be
measured in the optimizer’s train and test methods. In the
case of the provided TorchACOptimizer, we provide a method
of specifying a number of tests to run in a configuration ob-
ject, as well as function handles to specify what computations
to perform to produce metrics.
4 Experiments
Utilizing the framework above, we conduct some initial exper-
iments in training classification models with backdoors, with
the goal of understanding how training hyperparameters and
data configuration affect the trigger embedding and model
performance. We also propose a novel, but simple, non-visual
trigger for DRL to assess its feasibility as a backdoor.
4.1 Classification
We generate all datasets using the MNIST dataset as the
“seed” dataset, and the XFormMerge pipeline described above.
The parameter variations for our experiments are enumerated
in Table 2. For each generated dataset, we poison data labeled
4 and change the corresponding labels to 5, inciting the model
to predict 5 on images of 4 with the specified trigger.
Poisoning Trigger Placement XForms Batch Size
5 RL Static null 16
10 RRP Dynamic Rotate 32
20 64
30
40
50
Table 2: Experiments Matrix
For each possible unique configuration (6× 2× 2× 2× 3 =
144), we generate 15 trained models of the network architec-
ture defined in Fig. 11. This yields a total of 2160 MNIST
models, which were trained using the trojai framework. For
each experiment, we collect the performance metrics previ-
ously described, as well as training statistics. For each model
generated, we also apply the Neural Cleanse backdoor de-
tection algorithm [17] to determine how many models were
successfully detected as trojaned.
Figure 11: MNIST Architecture
4.2 Reinforcement Learning
We create a poisonable environment by wrapping the Boxing-
ram-v0 environment from OpenAI Gym [2] in an object that
can modify the observations to contain a simple trigger. The
trigger, in this case, is to add 100 to the observation, and then
modulo by 256 to be consistent with the observation space;
i.e.
obs = (obs + 100) % 256.
When the environment is not poisoned, it behaves the same
as the Boxing-ram-v0 environment, but when poisoned, it pro-
vides the model with triggered observations and rewards mul-
tiplied by −1.
For our architecture, we use an Actor-Critic model with a
shared embedding, shown in Fig. 12, and ReLU activations.
The input to the model consists of a flat vector of four steps,
where each step is a simplified version of the full RAM vector
representing the clock, player score, enemy score, player x
and y positions, and enemy x and y positions [1]. We further
simplify the training data by normalizing the RAM vector
and taking the sign of the reward. We train the architecture
using the TorchACOptimizer mentioned previously, with the
hyperparameters given in Table 3, and with ten environments
in parallel, eight of which are clean and two of which are
poisoned.
Hyperparameter Value
Horizon (T) 128
Adam stepsize 10−5
Num. epochs 3
Minibatch size 256
Discount 0.99
GAE parameter 0.95
Clipping parameter 0.1
VF coeff. 1
Entropy coeff. 0.01
Table 3: Hyperparameters used to train Boxing agent with
PPO.
Figure 12: Boxing RL Architecture
5 Results
We provide the results for the classification experiments here,
as well as a some analysis and observations regarding trig-
ger type and hyperparameter impact on training and perfor-
mance. We also include final results for our simple RL model.
5.1 Classification
For each experiment configuration, we examine the perfor-
mance of each trained model, and only compute aggregate
statistics on models which had at least 95% accuracy on the
clean data with and without triggers. For each model which
passes this threshold, we record the average triggered accu-
racy and the average number of epochs required to train the
model. We also use them to compute the model yield (i.e.,
number of models which pass the required thresholds defined
above) and whether Neural Cleanse detected an anomaly in
each of the models which passed the required thresholds for
every permutation of experiment configurations outlined in
Table 2. The results of these experiments are presented in
Tables 4, 5, 6 and Fig. 13. Several patterns are observed from
the results:
1. Fig. 13 shows that models trained with datasets where the
triggers that are placed in static locations have a higher
triggered data accuracy while maintaining clean data per-
formance. Tables 5 and 6 show that models trained with
datasets where the triggers that are placed in static lo-
cations have a higher chance of being properly embedded
while maintaining clean data performance.
These trends exist in both the reverse lambda trigger and
the random rectangular pattern trigger. Additionally, the
rotation of the trigger does not seem to affect the model
yield.
2. The trigger location or rotation did not affect the number
of epochs that these models are trained on, using the early
stopping criterion based on clean data loss. This suggests
that clean data behavior is learned at the same rate, regard-
less of the trigger type. This trend is consistent across both
triggers and all trigger placement and rotations tested.
3. Training batch size affects how long the model needs to be
trained, for all trigger types, rotations, and placement con-
figurations. More precisely, smaller batch sizes are observed
to exit training from the early stopping criterion faster, but
yield a statistically similar triggered accuracy. The results
are shown in Table 4. This suggests that smaller batch sizes
lead to faster training of the clean data while maintaining
similar triggered data performance. A likely explanation for
this behavior is that smaller batch sizes let the gradient de-
scent algorithm optimize for both clean and triggered data
performance, because a larger percentage of the batch is
triggered.
No clear trend emerges between the number of epochs
trained and the model yield when triggers are dynamically
placed in the image. In some scenarios, it is observed that
smaller batch sizes lead to a similar yield, where as in other
cases, it is observed that smaller batch sizes are inconsis-
tently correlated with yield. These results are detailed in
Tables 5 and 6.
4. Neural Cleanse is able to better detect the presence of
a trigger when the trigger is placed in a static location
throughout the dataset. Across all remaining test configu-
rations, the average percentage of correct detects for stati-
cally placed triggers is 19.61%. For dynamically placed re-
verse lambda triggers, the average percentage of correct
detects across all test configurations is 14.13%. Condition-
ing on the trigger type, the reverse lambda trigger is more
effectively detected by Neural Cleanse with an average cor-
rect detection percentage of 20.59% as compared to the
random rectangular pattern trigger, which has an average
correct detection percentage of 13.16%. Model yield and
Neural Cleanse results are detailed in Tables 5 and 6.
5.2 Reinforcement Learning
We measure the success of an agent on the Boxing task via
the agent’s average cumulative reward for both clean and poi-
soned environments over N games. For our experiment, we
assume an average cumulative reward of 50 on clean envi-
ronments while maintaining less than -50 on poisoned en-
vironments was sufficient to demonstrate a trojaned agent.
We test our agent intermittently, approximately every 100K
frames, during training by having the agent play 20 games
(N = 20) with clean data and 20 games with triggered data,
the results are shown in Fig. 14. The agent meets the desired
performance criteria after approximately 21.5 million frames
of data, which amounted to about 17000 optimization steps.
Final performance of the trained agent was measured again
using cumulative reward, but averaged over 100 games, (N =
100) instead of 20. The agent’s average cumulative reward
was 52.22 for clean environments, and -62.69 for poisoned,
showing that the agent was able to successfully maintain high
performance on clean data and low performance on triggered.
Batch Size Epochs Trained (µ± σ)
16 14.1± 2.4
32 15.7± 2.7
64 17.9± 2.9
Table 4: Experiment Results - Mean and Standard Deviation
of the number of epochs required to train the models for all
configurations of trigger, placement, and rotation.
Batch
Size
Dataset Poisoning Percentage
5 10 20 30 40 50
Static
NoRotation
16 1/15 2/15 2/15 4/14 2/11 2/14
32 4/15 3/15 4/15 3/15 1/14 8/15
64 1/15 4/15 4/15 0/15 3/13 3/14
Static
Rotation
16 4/15 3/14 6/15 4/14 3/14 5/14
32 3/15 4/15 7/15 1/15 6/14 3/15
64 2/15 5/15 4/14 7/15 4/14 4/15
Dynamic
NoRotation
16 0/13 3/14 0/9 3/7 1/2 0/2
32 1/14 1/11 2/8 2/6 0/2 1/2
64 1/14 2/11 1/9 0/4 0/4 1/2
Dynamic
Rotation
16 0/13 1/12 0/6 3/8 0/2 1/4
32 0/15 2/13 1/7 1/8 0/0 0/2
64 0/15 1/14 1/10 2/5 1/1 0/2
Table 5: Model Yield and Neural Cleanse Detection for
Reverse-Lambda trigger.
Batch
Size
Dataset Poisoning Percentage
5 10 20 30 40 50
Static
NoRotation
16 1/15 3/14 3/15 1/15 4/15 1/15
32 0/15 3/15 0/13 1/12 3/15 3/13
64 1/15 3/15 3/15 1/15 1/14 1/13
Static
Rotation
16 0/15 2/15 3/15 3/14 3/13 4/14
32 2/14 3/15 1/15 3/15 1/14 2/13
64 1/15 3/14 2/15 3/15 5/15 4/14
Dynamic
NoRotation
16 1/15 0/15 0/13 0/9 0/7 2/8
32 1/15 0/14 2/13 1/10 1/10 2/12
64 1/15 6/15 2/15 1/13 0/11 2/9
Dynamic
Rotation
16 0/15 1/13 2/13 1/11 2/9 0/7
32 2/15 0/14 3/13 1/14 1/7 1/2
64 1/15 0/13 1/13 3/11 2/9 0/4
Table 6: Model Yield and Neural Cleanse Detection for
Random-Rectangular trigger.
In each cell, the denominator indicates the number of models
which passed the 95% threshold for clean and triggered data perfor-
mance, and the numerator indicates how many of those were detected
to be anomalous by Neural Cleanse. For each trigger configuration,
cells colored in green indicate the best Neural Cleanse performance,
and cells colored in red indicate the worst Neural Cleanse performance.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced the trojai framework
for generating triggered datasets and corresponding trojaned
models. We have shown examples of how this framework may
be used for training supervised classification and reinforce-
ment learning tasks, and generating interesting results for
both. For classification, we were able to show the effect that
batch size and static versus dynamic trigger location has on
trigger embedding MNIST models, as well as compare model
yield and Neural Cleanse detection performance on compared
Figure 13: Accuracy of trojaned models which pass the
threshold criterion on triggered data. The results for static
and dynamic include all models trained under the various
trigger placement and trigger type configurations, and are av-
eraged across all batch sizes.
Figure 14: Intermediate test results for Boxing agent. Each
point represents the average cumulative reward of 20 games.
Tests were run approximately every 100K frames, or about
every 78 optimization steps.
to dataset poison rates. For reinforcement learning, we intro-
duced a novel, but simple trigger, and demonstrate its fea-
sibility on OpenAI Gym’s Boxing environment with RAM
observations.
In the future, we hope to extend this framework to incorpo-
rate additional data modalities such as audio and additional
tasks such as object detection, which have been shown to be
vulnerable to similar style attacks [19]. We also plan to expand
on the library of datasets, architectures, and triggered RL en-
vironments for rapid testing and production of multiple trig-
gered models of different types across data modalities. Finally,
we plan to incorporate recent advances in trigger embedding
methodologies which are designed to evade detection [9, 15].
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